Introduction
In July 2005 President Bush signed an agreement with India recognizing India as a nuclear power and providing for both some measure of international regulation of its nuclear capabilities and resources and for US civilian nuclear exports to India. This deal was reconfirmed in March 2006 during President Bush's visit to India. Although this deal aroused much controversy in Washington, Congress has approved it. However, its nuclear provisions may actually be ultimately less important than its geopolitical significance. This accord's geopolitical importance lies in the fact that it represents America's open acceptance and acknowledgement of India's rising capabilities, ambitions to be a great power in Asia, and the consequences thereof. 1 Thus this agreement demonstrates that Washington has accepted the legitimacy of India's quest for independent great power status. 2 Second, it highlights India's achievement of strategic autonomy where it is strong enough to pick its own partners without undue fear of the consequences. 3 Consequently Washington's acceptance of this achievement not only marks a milestone in the two states' bilateral relations, it also reflects that India has become, for every key international actor, a most desirable strategic partner if not ally. Third, by virtue of its capabilities and geostrategic setting, India is now a desirable partner that is sought after by both the great powers and middle powers alike. So there is a reciprocal process taking place wherein India can choose its partners freely and duly becomes more desirable as a partner to ever more governments.
Because India is now intrinsically desirable as a partner, it has greater flexibility than ever before and therefore its assets add to the Stephen Blank is a Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College in Pennsylvania. strategic capability of its partners. Consequently American interests could suffer if Washington does not move quickly to embrace that reality. Accordingly this partnership is not founded merely or exclusively on common values of democracy however important they may be. After all, for much of the last half-century democracy did not prevent mutual estrangement. 4 Rather the basis for this partnership is mutual needs and interests, possibly an even stronger foundation for genuine partnership than is the invocation of abstract values.
Geopolitical Consequences and Benefits for India: Global Partnership and Defense Sales
Both American and foreign observers recognize the significance of this fact, acknowledged by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when she stated in March 2005 that it was US policy "to help make India become a major world power in the twenty-first century." Moreover, in this selfsame statement, senior officials underscored that they fully understood what such a commitment meant because they also talked about American support for Indian requests for "transformative systems in such areas as command and control, early warning, and missile defenses." 5 Some Russian sources charged that the July 2005 deal also contained a "secret, non-nuclear double" whereby each side signed "letters of intent" concerning the participation of US firms in a major tender for India's upcoming purchase of 126 medium/light fighters. 6 While a major aspect of the partnership undoubtedly is invigorated bilateral defense cooperation and US analysts want Washington to take part in this tender, that charge cannot be verified. 7 Nevertheless the two sides' enhanced defense cooperation is noteworthy. The bilateral Defense Framework of 2005 signed by both countries' defense ministers calls for expansion of joint military exercises and exchanges, defense trade, and the establishment of a bilateral defense procurement and production group from both countries. More prosaically, it also identified issues for building Indo-American defense collaboration and achieving greater inter-operability of their forces across the spectrum of security and defense. Specifically this agreement looks to cooperation in multinational operations, counterterrorism, the promotion of regional peace and security, fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, calls for expanded cooperation on missile defense, disaster response, combined operations, and peacekeeping operations, and increased exchanges of intelligence.
Similarly, in response to both the deal with Washington and the latter's sale of up to 36 F-16C/Ds to Pakistan, the Indian Air Force is calling for an acceleration of its own upgrades, especially as the legislative "wheels are in motion" for the US to approve formally the initial delivery of 18 Block 52 Pratt & Whitney PW 100-229 powered F-16/C/Ds with an option for 18 more. 9 And since US firms only sold $100 million worth of goods to India's defense sector, whose procurement was $12 billion in 2005, the opportunities for closer defense ties are very great. 10 At the same time it is clear that Indo-American discussions now regularly include a review of all the outstanding security issues in South and Central Asia, if not Southeast Asia, China, and the Gulf. 11 Indeed, Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill told Indian audiences in 2001 that President Bush seeks to intensify collaboration with India across the range of issues on the global agenda and concluded that, "In short, President Bush has a global approach to US-Indian relations, consistent with the rise of India as a world power." 12 The revelation of such discussions has already led Pakistani analysts to claim that the United States has recognized India's "sphere of influence" in Asia. 13 Other analysts claim that this agreement represents a threat to Pakistan's economy and security. Allegedly this agreement presages the qualitative improvement of Indian armaments as India will allegedly move from reliance upon Russian weapons and technologies to integration with NATO on the basis of its standards, reform of India's defense industries, and forthcoming arms purchases from the West.
14 Therefore it is hardly surprising that on April 12, 2006 Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf convened a meeting of military and political officials to discuss the implications of the Indo-American nuclear agreement and that the Pakistani National Command Authority (NCA) then stated that, "In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met."
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But although the Indo-Pakistani arms race and political rivalry will continue throughout South and Central Asia that does not alter the significance of the Indian deal with America. Whether or not the new partnership goes as far as Pakistani pundits fear, it certainly does accept the self-evident fact that India is and will be the primary power on the subcontinent and that therefore this requires intimate bilateral strategic-military, political, and economic coordination across a range of issues with India. Neither is this agreement confined to South Asia for, as Blackwill stated above, "Washington wants to make New Delhi not just a regional ally, but a global partner." 16 Today we see the fruits of such collaboration in joint discussions and approaches to seeking an end to civil strife in Nepal and, possibly more importantly, in Central Asia. 17 Indeed, although this cooperation hardly stops at Central Asia, new trends in this region express the new partnership and its implications with particular force. For example, in 2006 the US government launched a major diplomatic effort with India to tie together South Asia with Central Asia in order to give the states of Central Asia alternatives to Russian energy domination over them. 18 This initiative encompasses a reorganization of the State Department to place the Central Asian states in a newly restructured Department of South Asian and Central Asian Affairs with its own Assistant Secretary of State, giving this area a much needed injection of power in the bureaucracy. But beyond this and a stepped-up program of high-level visits to South and Central Asia, starting with President Bush's visit in March 2006, there is also a major US initiative to stimulate infrastructural and electrical power connection and investments throughout Central Asia that would allow India to play more effectively in this region as a source of and market for trade, investment, and energy. One benefit for India of this initiative is that it would also substantially help India satisfy its enormous energy needs.
India's Self-Perceived Asian Role
But the benefits for both sides in this deal are not restricted to that part of Asia, or to coordinated discussion of policies with Washington, and greater access to nuclear technologies and arms sales. Indian leaders' statements about their vision for Central Asia explicitly include the rest of the continent in that vision. Most importantly, India's legitimate, substantial, and growing interests and capabilities in regard to Central Asia and Asia more generally are fully accepted as normal by all the major powers that are active there. Indeed, they are all competing with each other for influence with New Delhi whose strategic leverage is enhanced by its ability to engage in non-binding partnerships with America, Russia, Japan, and China. 19 In Central Asia, both the United States and India want India to become and be seen as a magnet for Central Asian states' development. It is important for Washington and New Delhi that Central Asia does not fall under exclusive Russian and/or Chinese influence. Since the thrust of the new US policy is to give local governments other alternatives in energy cooperation and foreign investment, the growth of India's presence in Central Asia and ability to influence key economic and political decisions there is decidedly in the US interest. Obviously the same strategic reasoning of providing alternatives to Moscow and Beijing holds true for India, perhaps with more emphasis on China. Indeed, already in 1997 Russia's press reported that in private Indo-Russian diplomatic conversations, "Russian and Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists." 20 Indian experts similarly saw Russian weakness in Central Asia in the 1990s as opening the way to a Chinese-orchestrated encirclement of its interests there and regarded such a trend negatively. 21 Consequently India began to expand its interest and presence in Central Asia soon afterwards. 22 Since then it has become clear that India sees itself as a major independent economic player with a leading role throughout all of Asia including Central Asia. M. K. Naranayan, India's National Security Advisor, told the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich in 2006 that, In South Asia, for example, those of our neighbors who were farseeing enough to understand the benefits of linking their economies to the Indian economic motor have been rewarded handsomely. ---It is with this optimism of new opportunities and broader horizons that India now approaches its neighbors and the rest of Asia. ---India's location, straddling as it does all the major sub-regions of Asia, provides it with a unique vantage point. ---If the basis for a stable and prosperous Asia lies in both political and economic integration-cutting across cultures, historical divisions, ideologies and barriers (both physical and ideological)-then India is eminently suited to play a leading role. commonalities. In this, we see India's destiny interlinked with that of Asia. From this point of view, developing relations with Asian countries is one of our priorities, while pursuing a cooperative architecture of pan-Asian regionalism is a key area of focus in our foreign policy. Geography imparts a unique position to India in the geopolitics of the Asian continent, with our footprint extending well beyond South Asia and our interests straddling across different sub-categories of Asia-be it East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. ---It is this geopolitical reality and our conviction that enhanced regional cooperation is mutually advantageous, which sustain our enthusiasm to participate in endeavors for regional integration, ranging from [the] South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation to [the] East Asia Summit, and [the] Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 24 Clearly Saran here laid down a marker to both his audience and to all other observers who watch Indian activities in Central Asia, if not throughout the Asian landmass.
Similarly Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee linked together economics and security with India's expansive vision of itself as a potential stabilizer in Central Asia in a 2005 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Mukherhjee linked the revival of trade with Central Asia to the security advantages of tolerance and democracy as practiced in India but simultaneously emphasized that India does not practice the export of democracies, an idea that has aroused much anti-American suspicion there.
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India's Strategic Autonomy and Enhanced Capabilities
Thus India's achievements now have forced the great powers, Russia, China, and the United States, to acknowledge the legitimacy of its security and energy interests in Central Asia and to seek Indian support either for their goals or at least to parallel them in Central Asia if not beyond. In other words, they need Indian friendship as much if not more than India needs their friendship.
The American seal of good housekeeping has also stimulated Australia, France, Japan, and Russia to support the transfer of civilian nuclear technologies to India and for Great Britain to enter into discussions with India about such transfers. 26 Evidently China and India are also on the verge of an agreement that would enable the buying and exchange of nuclear technology. 27 Indeed, one analysis of the Russian deal called this agreement with Washington an enabling agreement for (inter alia) the resumption of Indo-Russian civil nuclear cooperation even though it raised some concerns in Washington. 28 And obviously this is also true insofar as other states are concerned. Thus India has already begun to reap the many tangible military, economic, technological, and political benefits of this deal. In the wake of the bilateral agreement Indian analysts also concurred that one of its many dividends would be the enhanced attractiveness of India as a partner and an equal enhancement of its status as a great power and the reach of its influence in Asia if not beyond. 29 Similarly Australia signed its first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with India on cooperation in joint training, maritime securitywith a significant cooperative clause on maritime security in the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean-and defense R&D on March 6, 2006. 30 Likewise, Singapore told Mukherjee in June 2006 that it was keen to deepen defense ties with India, including joint exercises, training, naval, maritime, and counter-terrorist cooperation and formalize them in its own MOU. 31 India's desirability as a strategic partner for major players in Asia as well as the European Union is also increasingly visible. Japan is significantly upgrading energy and security cooperation with India, clearly to ensure its own energy security and due to shared apprehensions about China. 32 For over a decade Russia has made strenuous efforts to consolidate and advance its political and military ties to India. Arms sales to India constitute between 30 and 40 percent of the annual revenues coming to Russia from arms sales, without which it could not finance either the re-equipping of its forces or of defense industry.
Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's and then President Vladimir Putin's policies toward India calling for a strategic triangle with Russia and China were based on many factors, not least an appreciation both of India's and China's rising power, and the fact that these two great powers could eventually come into conflict in Asia, forcing upon Russia a most undesirable choice between Indian or Chinese friendship. Or else an Indo-Pakistani crisis could have repercussions throughout Asia, including China that could again force Russia to make the aforementioned choice between major Asian powers that it does not wish to make. Since Primakov's original initiative Russia has pursued this idea assiduously, giving rise to its fear of losing India as a partner, or even ally, and being left alone in Asia with a resurgent China. All three powers also share a common interest in squelching threats from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism within their boundaries and in Central Asia, a zone that essentially abuts each of them.
Today India can meet with Russia and China in support of Primakov's concept of a strategic triangle, as it did in 2005 at a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Vladivostok, and yet suffer no repercussions from Washington. 33 Indeed, the Indo-American agreement was signed six weeks after this conference. These events show that India will be nobody's ally or subordinate but will continue to pursue its own independent orientation, although today that orientation gravitates more strongly toward Washington than ever before. So it is impossible to say, as do Russian commentators, that there is a general agreement among the three powers that a multipolar world is more desirable than is American unipolarity, and to suggest that they share a "latent" anti-US orientation for such an inclination to Moscow and Beijing contradicts the entire essence and spirit of the US-India agreement.
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India and China
Moreover, it is the fact of Indo-American rapprochement that has probably most driven China to reduce tensions with India, as Russia has advocated, and embrace this triangle, albeit in altered form, i.e. the tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2005, despite its earlier skepticism about the idea. This suggests that Thomas Christensen was on the right track when he argued that the balance between US integrationist policies vis-à-vis China and the maintenance of tough defense of strategic interests through coercive or military means has helped produce pacific effects in modifying Chinese aversion to multilateralism and to improved relations with many of its neighbors, not least India. 35 Indeed, both Christensen and Chinese observers like Li Yihu of Peking University have argued that the response to the Indo-American rapprochement must be forthcoming on Beijing's part. 36 Similarly, as India's partnership with America grew, the status accruing to India, as well as its visible growth in power, has obliged China to effectuate a highly public rapprochement with India and become a major Indian trading partner. 37 India's nuclear tests, ascension to the role of bona fide nuclear power, rising economic and conventional military capabilities, and especially its visible rapprochement with America arguably discomfited Beijing considerably, obliging it to make this rapprochement and acknowledge India's increased attractiveness as a strategic partner. 38 Thus even as Beijing hints at upgrading its nuclear relationship with Pakistan as a riposte to the Indo-American agreement and seeks to minimize India's involvement with ASEAN and its associated organizations, it has nevertheless been forced to make and continue a detente with India. 39 Consequently India's rapprochement with America not only obliged China to take more account of India than it has hitherto been willing to do, it also reflected the power of this partnership, even before the Bush Administration offer of July 2005, to moderate Chinese policy and to enhance India's standing throughout Asia.
This fact also points to two other conclusions. India's desirability as a partner has already forced major interlocutors like China and Russia to assent to its observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), thereby recognizing its status. Furthermore, despite its habitual policy of trying to reduce India's status and confine it to South Asia, the Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in states like Myanmar, China's support for Pakistan, hints of Chinese nuclear assistance to it in the light of the Indo-American agreement, and China's presence in its port city of Gwadar where it is building a major naval infrastructure for Pakistan and possibly for itself, China has been forced to come to terms with India's enhanced role, status, and capabilities. 40 Thus China's diplomatic initiatives to South and Southeast Asia reflect, albeit in varying degrees, the altered strategic conditions in these parts of Asia generated not only by its own rise to power but by India's ensuing rise in economic and military capabilities and the Indo-American rapprochement and partnership. In other words, thanks to this Indo-American rapprochement, China's margin for conducting a tough Realpolitik against India has diminished considerably.
India's Capabilities as a Factor in its Rise to Great Power Status
The American offer of strategic partnership as well as India's overall desirability as a partner to other great powers like China and Russia reflects India's continuing rate of economic growth which now approaches 8 percent per annum and the fact, as recognized by US commanders, that India has a world class, "superb, professional military force" with which it is highly desirable for the US to engage on a permanent basis. 41 India's rising economic and military capabilities not only ensure that it is and will remain the pre-eminent partner in the South Asian subcontinent, they also facilitate its ability to project power and influence abroad.
India now has an apparently operational air base in Tajikistan collocated with a Russian base at Farkhor (or Ayni) in Tajikistan. 42 Central Asia is equally, if not more important to it as a venue for new energy sources. And India therefore eagerly competes for access to Central Asian oil and gas. It is expanding defense collaboration and economic penetration, often much of it connected also with the quest for energy in Africa and Southeast Asia. 43 And in many cases local governments are seeking defense cooperation with India in Southeast and even Northeast Asia, probably as a balance to China. 44 It also is helping to protect the Straits of Malacca against international piracy and/or terrorism. And it participates in the Asian Regional Forum and ASEAN's 7+1 forum. 45 In the Middle East it has managed to combine a flourishing defense partnership with Israel with good relations with Iran, for whose energy it is a major customer. 46 And at the same time it also serves as a major refiner of Iran's crude oil.
Indo-Russian Collaboration in Central Asia
These trends in Asia's international relations illustrate the benefits that accrue to India merely from the prospect of partnership with America, not to mention its actuality. Indeed, Russia's and China's fears about what this partnership might mean have galvanized them both to offer inducements to India to support each of them, e.g. increased trading opportunities with China, observer status in the SCO, better terms on Russian weapons sales to India, thereby enhancing India's status and capabilities in world affairs. 47 For example, Russia supports India's full membership in the SCO. 48 Likewise it is clear that Russian analysts, if not officials, are very concerned about losing the Indian arms market to America. There are also more telling examples of the mutual advantage both sides derive from Indo-Russian collaboration, e.g. in Central Asia. Russian and Indian diplomats began discussions in February 2006 on the possibility of enlarging the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia's military alliance in Central Asia, and on whether India might participate in its forums. 49 The reasons for these consultations appear to ratify Russia's and India's appreciation of potential challenges there and the contribution that India could make to overcoming them. Specifically, two reasons for this initiative have been cited. Firstly, because of the unstable situation created by the possibility of a military crisis over Iran, India is forced into seeking to secure, as quickly as possible, access to energy sources in post-Soviet Central Asia, sources whose availability would be guaranteed by some political and military mechanism; in an emergency, the CSTO institutions could be mobilized to ensure the security of gas and oil production in the region. Second, a war against Iran could destabilize India's neighbor Pakistan where radical Islamists are influential; this could amount to a serious threat to the whole region. 50 Indian participation in the CSTO would sidestep Chinese objections to its full membership in the SCO, buttress Russia's position there against China's interest in acquiring bases in Central Asia, and at the same time obviously enhance India's position and capabilities in Central Asia. It is a sign of Russian partiality to India that it sees nothing wrong with India maintaining an air base in Tajikistan at Farkhor (Ayni) as long as it is collocated with its own base there, but vocally and staunchly opposes any other foreign military presence in the area. Russia may have pressured India into locating the two bases together as has recently been charged, but it has steadfastly opposed any foreign bases in Central Asia except this Indian base. 51 So this potential enhancement of the already existing Indo-Russian strategic partnership has an implicit value in also restraining China's capacity for power projection (and not just military power either) into Central Asia.
Indo-American Cooperation
Thus India's rapprochement with the great powers not only encompasses enhanced political ties but also sensitive military planning with them. Neither is this confined to Central Asia. For example, one American consultant, writing about the prospects for Indo-American cooperation in space, forthrightly stated that,
The new strategic partnership between the United States and India has the potential to be the turning point around which a new geopolitical balance of power will form. A key element in this partnership-US-India space cooperation-will most likely become the defining relationship for space cooperation around which other space-faring nations will posture their international space cooperation strategies. 52 These discussions about the transfer of nuclear technologies to India also go far to ratify India's long-standing claim that it is not a proliferation threat but rather a responsible steward of nuclear power (whether or not that claim is actually true) and also testifies to its increased political standing and overall commercial attractiveness as a partner to other major economic actors. At the same time, in historical terms, this relationship builds on previous Indian policies and strategies while also leaning forward to an unprecedented strategic partnership with the United States. On the one hand, this new strategic partnership conforms to India's history since independence where it has sought the leverage offered by cooperation with a great power, most prominently the Soviet Union during 1964-85, to realize its strategic ambitions in South Asia if not beyond. As a Japanese analyst, Horimoto Takenori observes, Reviewing the past half-century of Indian diplomacy, therefore, we can see that it has consistently sought strategic partnerships to serve its national interests; it has been a diplomacy of what one might call geopolitical partnerships. Since the 1990s, in the interests of promoting economic liberalization and improving its security strength, it has come to need closer relationships with the superpower United States. 53 But, on the other hand, Washington's acceptance of the legitimacy of Indian ambitions and the reality of its present and future economicstrategic capabilities amounts to a wholly unprecedented US recognition that India is already reaching or about to reach that status and level of capability on its own. Although psychologically it may be appealing to Indians to have this status conferred upon India by America, in fact India's indigenous capabilities make such a move both timely and necessary for all major international actors, not just the United States, in spite of the continuing legacy of poverty and backwardness that still inhibits Indian development. 54 Therefore this acknowledgement also represents US acceptance of the fact that India's rise to power comports with US strategic interests and requires a commensurate US adjustment to the implications of that rise. For example, Anupam Srivastava reports that, Since 2002, the Pentagon has conducted a series of assessments reviewing its defense co-production options with NATO and Asia-Pacific partners and contrasted them with newer options such as partnering with India. The net assessment is that given India's comparative advantage in select segments of high-technology, if technology safeguards in India were to be beefed up to prevent unauthorized diversion of US technologies, then the two sides can profitably partner to produce weapons systems and component that could be absorbed by their respective armed forces and also exported to select destinations. To an extent, this assessment has complemented bilateral efforts to deepen defense cooperation and improve "firewalls" between and within India's defense and civilian sectors, most notably through the High Technology Cooperation Group (2003) and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004). 55 The success of both those programs paved the way for the agreements in 2005 on civilian nuclear technology and on defense cooperation and shows how economic and security issues come together in this relationship. Indeed, the 2005 agreement cannot be divorced from strategic considerations.
Reaching out to India and assisting it with nuclear cooperation at a time when it is a relatively weak state geopolitically bequeaths the United States with greater dividends than would be the case if such assistance were offered after India had already become a true great power and a repository of sophisticated nuclear technologieswhen New Delhi presumably would have lesser need for such cooperation.
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India as a Great Power
And this growing partnership also takes place with both states increasingly mindful of China's growing capabilities throughout Asia. Takenori states that, India, in terms of the structure of international relations, is seen as a "counter balancer" to China. Most countries that feel wary or threatened by China do not have such apprehensions toward India. Indeed, because India is not yet considered a "major power" in the true sense, it can be said that any country can use India as a valued card to be played in the game with China. 57 Similarly, Srivastava argues that rapprochement with Washington enhances India's position in what he calls a tripolar relationship between it, Beijing and Washington.
And while India's interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the United States, this tripolar dynamic certainly affords it the opportunity to improve its position vis-à-vis both China and the United States. That is why, as noted earlier, an unspoken element of this cooperation is for India to develop the capability for joint operations with the United States and provide it military basing and logistical assistance to curb any Chinese activism that might undermine Asian security and prosperity in the future. 58 At the same time, the Indian achievement of becoming a major power in its own right and worthy of alignment with major powers (bundnisfahig in German) has long been anticipated by outside observers as well as devoutly wished for by Indian elites. 59 In 1988 Henry Kissinger observed that India was becoming the dominant military country in its region and that it had not hesitated to use that power to advance its national interests. He therefore concluded that, "I expect Indian influence to radiate in the Indian Ocean and down to Singapore, and Southeast Asia will become sort of a four-power contest among China, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan." 60 American military analysts then also expected a substantial growth in Indian defense and power projection capabilities leading into the present. 61 A contemporary geopolitical assessment of India's place in Asia would have to admit that much of this forecast has come to pass or is about to. Central Asia. 63 And this outlook is certainly shared by the Indian Army and Navy if not the Air Force. 64 Indeed, the military program of present and past Indian governments clearly envisions a major augmentation of India's power projection capabilities into Asia as a whole not just Central Asia.
In late 2003, to signify its sense of itself as a rising Asian power, Prime Minister Atal Behar Vajpayee's government opted for a 20 year program to become a world power whose influence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia. 65 Vajpayee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He claimed that India's expanded security perspectives require fresh thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security in all these directions. Therefore India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably going beyond intelligence sharing about terrorist activities. This cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. In this context strategic partnership with Washington is essential because Russia's ties with India are tempered by Moscow's dependence on the West, particularly America. In the absence of partnership with Washington, this situation would severely constrain Indian options since it could no longer hide behind Russia if it clashed with America. 66 While India formally eschews offensive military projections to intervene unilaterally in other countries, it announced that its air base in Ayni, Tajikistan had been operational since 2002 and hopes to undertake the following military programs through 2013:
• Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan.
• Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
• Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African states, Iran, Oman, the UAE and other Gulf nations.
• Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to Myanmar to contain Chinese activities there. 67 Beyond those policies all the Indian military services are undertaking a major buildup of conventional weapons, ways of delivering nuclear weapons, and defenses against nuclear missiles by improving communication and surveillance systems. This ongoing buildup obviously intends to project Indian power and influence not just to Central Asia, but also throughout Asia, and represents what analysts are calling "strategic assertion." 68 More recently it has become clear that India is reshaping its procurement and training plans to enhance its capacity for power projection and insertion of forces behind enemy lines. 69 This program embraces all sections of the Indian armed forces. 70 For example, the Indian Air Force wants to evolve into an expeditionary force with a strategic reach beyond its borders because it believes that in the future, as Air Marshal Tyagi, Commander in Chief of the Indian Air Force suggested, it may well have to project power anywhere from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, including Central Asia, and to be ready for an enormous range of potential contingencies. 71 From Beijing's point of view, such contingencies might even include joint Indo-American naval action to block its navy from entering the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait. Chinese strategists are not only increasingly nervous about America's capability to block Chinese naval and energy supplies from crossing or entering the Indian Ocean, they discern that India's rising naval ambitions and capabilities could lead it to undertake similar actions alone or with America. Thus they cite Washington's so-called regional maritime security initiative in the Malacca Strait "as a first step by the US military to 'garrison the Strait' under the guise of counter-terrorist measures." 72 And, looking at Indo-American joint anti-terrorist patrols along the Malacca Strait, straddling Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, they fear that Washington would use New Delhi's naval strength to block its fleets from entering into those waters. 73 Thus India's growing capabilities for power projection throughout Asia accompany the growth of its desirability as a partner for major global actors in reciprocal fashion. China's concerns about India's overall presence in and around Southeast Asia are well merited. And there is good reason to suspect that China also carefully monitors the growth of India's power projection capabilities into Central Asia as well. 74 Since 2002, if not before, India has been projecting military power and influence into both Central and Southeast Asia. Retired Brigadier General V. K. Nair, a leading strategist, spoke for the entire Indian establishment when he told the US National Defense University in 2001 that, India needs to evolve a broad based strategy that would not only ensure the security of its vital interests but also provide policy options for effectively responding to developing situations in the area. India's geostrategic location dictates that the primary focus of its security policies must be its relationship with the neighboring countries and the countries that form part of its "extended security horizon" which in one official publication is defined as "regions with economic, social, cultural, and environmental linkages [that] result in overlapping security interests. 75 But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into Southeast Asia and Central Asia where China is expanding its influence, India must compete with China on price and quality in the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, patrol ships, light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast Asia at reduced price and with better equipment. 76 Furthermore,
Over the next decade, India intends to produce weapons system China cannot, including an indigenously designed air defense shipbasically a small aircraft carrier. Through subsidies, loans, and higher technology, New Delhi hopes to supplant China as a major regional arms supplier. It also can take advantage of underlying concerns about China within Southeast Asia, touting Indian weapons systems as free from the risks of being swallowed by an aggressive China in the future. 78 And it is also driven by the immense geostrategic transformations of the last decade, the rise of China, the rise of India, and the attacks of September 11. Despite rhetoric about shared values because India and the United States are democracies, those shared values, if anything, obstructed cooperation. Today, although democracy is important in ways that were not previously the case, what drives this partnership are common interests and shared threats. Indian elites know full well that if India is to play the role which they all wish for it, it must embrace economic globalization and break through the accumulated institutional and cognitive structures that hold much of its population in thrall and in poverty. Moreover, it must keep pace with China if it does not want to be eclipsed even in South Asia, not to mention elsewhere. Lastly, it must find a way to overcome the constant and probably growing threat of terrorism aiming at Kashmir and its Northeastern frontier.
This determination is visible in the competition between India and China for access to energy and also in India's determination to project its power in tandem with Southeast and Northeast Asian states, but alone if necessary throughout the Indian Ocean. India not only shares with Washington a concern as to what the rise of China might portend, it also obviously is similarly threatened by Islamic terrorism in Central and South Asia. The economic potentials of an unshackled India, as well as the more prosaic possibilities of major US arms sales, energy investments, and technology transfer to India also buttress a common or complementary relationship and it is therefore hardly surprising that much of the current emphasis in these relations as well as much of the public justification for the Indo-American deal on nuclear energy is in stimulating Indo-American commercial relationships and Indian domestic reform, along with the benefits of strategic partnership. 79 Finally, even though New Delhi and Washington share common concerns about China's rise and its potential implications for them, this is not a containment strategy in name or in reality. India will not engage in a containment policy or let itself be used for such purposes and this has long been a cardinal point in Indian official statements. 80 But, as we have shown here, India's rising power and its improved relationships with all the major powers creates a situation whereby China and Russia must reckon with India thus limiting China's interest and ability in challenging its or Washington's vital interests too directly. This phenomenon has been noticed abroad as well. For example, already in 2003, when the trends were pointing in the direction of Indo-American partnership, A source at the Russian Foreign Ministry told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that since 11 September 2001 Beijing has substantially reviewed its position in South Asia. Much more attention has begun to be devoted to India, and China has realized that Delhi must be brought more actively into the sphere of Chinese geopolitical and foreign economic interests. The Chinese leadership has also begun to regard the Kashmir issue in a new light, finding out for itself that terrorist groupings of radical Islamists from Xinqiang (Xinjiang) have entrenched themselves in the territory of that former Indian principality. And though Pakistan remains the stronghold of Chinese influence in South Asia, nonetheless there is clear evidence of a desire on Beijing's part to balance its policy in this area. 81 Thus it is clear that an India which is developing rapidly-and with American help that development is more likely than ever-represents what might be called an existential deterrent to or check upon Chinese expansionism or desire to stir up trouble in Asia. Although we have stressed the implications of this partnership deal in Central Asia, they apply with no less force to Southeast Asia, as the rise in Indian interest and capability in that region indicate. 82 And India's enhanced capacities are similarly now regarded as a positive factor in Moscow, which supports the Indo-American nuclear deal. Russian Ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov admitted that Russia supports the IndoAmerican nuclear deal and that Russia does not fear the upcoming competition to provide India with nuclear energy because the Indian market is a huge one. Moreover, he and Russian analysts view India as a thriving democratic country with a strong set of controls over the export of its nuclear technology and have promoted the view that the status quo with regard to India in the non-proliferation treaty regime ought to be changed. 83 In other words, the Indo-American deal has enabled Washington and Delhi to board a moving train and accelerate its journey to a common destination, forcing other interested bystanders to seek to catch up with it as well lest their vital interests be significantly harmed. Indeed, other powers' awareness of this partnership is obliging them to compensate India handsomely even as they complain about it. 84 Therefore this agreement is strategic in the highest sense, i.e. it transforms the playing field and introduces a new dynamic that everyone 20 India Review must reckon with. But that reckoning and the widening ramifications of this partnership are inestimably of benefit to both Washington's and Delhi's, if not to the larger security of Asia as whole.
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